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Abstract. This article analyzes the recent Israeli military withdrawal from southern Lebanon in the
context of the efficacy of terrorism in the 21st century.
Many Israelis would claim that Hezbollah is and has been a political group, a political group dedicated to
driving Israel out of Southern Lebanon, and a political group that has employed terrorism to drive Israel
out. Many Israelis would go further and claim that Hezbollah is also dedicated to destroying the Israeli
state by any means necessary--including terrorism. Thus, Hezbollah may still remain a terrorist threat to
the Israeli people.
One aspect of worrying about future terrorism is whether past terrorism has been successful. So, has it
in the case of Hezbollah terrorism targeting Israel? An easy answer is yes it has. Hezbollah publicly
declared that it would continue its attacks against Israel until the latter withdrew from southern
Lebanon. And the latter did withdraw.
From Hezbollah's publicly stated viewpoint, the attacks induced the withdrawal. And the Hezbollah rank
and file, leadership, and state and non-state sponsors may believe in this public view. But there is
another view point. Many foreign policy experts claim that the Israeli government withdrew because it
finally arrived at the realization that occupying southern Lebanon was no longer in its interests--as
defined by some combination of strategic, ethical/moral, and domestic political considerations. To this
viewpoint, Hezbollah terrorist acts were irrelevant, redundant, and even self-defeating to the goal of
Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon.
Although splitting the difference often yields muddled or simplistic assessments, clarity and complexity
seem to apply to splitting differences in the case at hand. Specifically, another viewpoint is that
Hezbollah unwittingly helped Israel reach the correct viewpoint that occupation was not in Israeli
interests. Certainly, one can posit that the Israeli occupation could easily be construed as incompatible
with Israeli professed ethical and moral interests, as divisive in its domestic politics, and of questionable
strategic benefit--militarily, economically, socioculturally, and so on. Yet a decision for occupation had
been made and once made and effected took on a life of its own and significant resistance and inertia to
moving from some status quo. Given that Hezbollah terrorism induced an ending to the occupation
policy, one can assert that terrorism achieved a political objective that was positive for the target and
perpetrator. (The positive in the latter case seems to comprise the political clout that Hezbollah now
may have in Lebanon, even as the withdrawal leaves some tactical and strategic difficulties for leaders in
Lebanon, Syria, Iran, and, yes, of Hezbollah.)
The lesson learned for other enemies of Israel may, then, be a bittersweet one. Yes, terrorism can
achieve a political objective, a change in behavior of an adversary. But one must be careful about what
one desires, because a terrorist success may concurrently beget a terrorist failure. (See Byman, D.
(1998). The logic of ethnic terrorism. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 21, 149-169; Hutchinson, M.C.
(1972). The concept of revolutionary terrorism. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 16, 383-396; Merari, A., &
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